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satisfying this burden, there will be no violation of either the
Sixth Amendment or article I, section 6, of the New York State
Constitution. Only "serious" defects will render counsel
ineffective, thereby affording the defendant a valid constitutional
claim.
137 1

People v. Allah
(decided November 24, 1992)
1 373
The defendant claimed that his State1372 and Federal
Constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel were
violated when his attorney failed to represent him during jury
attorney assumed
Although codefendants'
deliberations.
representation, a conflict of interest existed between the
defendant and codefendants. The defendant was not made aware
of potential risks of having codefendants' counsel take over his
representation. As a result, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
1374
because his attorney was absent during deliberations.
Furthermore, joint representation by codefendants' counsel
presented an actual conflict of interest, since it was done without
the informed consent of the defendant. 13 75 Therefore, the order
of the appellate division, affirming the judgment of conviction,
was reversed and a new trial ordered. 1376
The defendant was tried in Supreme Court, Kings County in a
joint trial with two codefendants. The codefendants, however,
were represented by separate counsel. The jury returned a verdict
of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and

1371. 80 N.Y.2d 396, 605 N.E.2d 327, 590 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1992).

1372. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel. ... " Id.
1373. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." Id.
1374. Allah, 80 N.Y.2d at 400, 605 N.E.2d at 330, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
1375. Id. at 401, 605 N.E.2d at 330, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 843.

1376. Id.
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robbery in the first degree, but acquitted the codefendants of all
charges. 1377 Four individuals, the complainants in this case, were
leaving a housing project when they were confronted by a group
of males, some of whom were carrying guns. Two of the four
individuals were shot. 13 7 8 At trial, the three defendants tried to
establish that they were elsewhere when the crimes occurred.
However, three of the four complainants identified defendant
Allah from a lineup, and again at trial. 13 7 9 In this case, it was the
testimony of one of the codefendant's witnesses which created the
conflict for the defendant. The witness testified at the trial that
she saw defendant Allah running with a gun in his hand

immediately after the gunshot was heard. The witness further
testified that she had not seen the other two codefendants at the
scene. 1380
Originally, all three defendants had been represented by
separate counsel. 13 8 1 However, during jury deliberations,
counsel for defendant Allah informed the court that he would be

out of town for a few days, during which time his client would be

1377. Id. at 399, 605 N.E.2d at 329, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
1378. Id. at 398, 605 N.E.2d at 328, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 841. All four
complainants had their hats stolen, and the assailants attempted to take their
coats. Id.
1379. Id. at 398, 605 N.E.2d at 328-29, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42. At trial
four other eyewitnesses testified, one of whom stated that her son, a
codefendant, was at home fifteen minutes prior to the act in question.
Defendant Allah called two witnesses who testified that neither defendant Allah
nor his codefendants were present at the incident. Id. at 398, 605 N.E.2d at
329, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
1380. Id. at 398-99, 605 N.E.2d at 328-29, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42. The
testimony given by this witness clearly demonstrated the conflict that existed
by the joint representation of defendant Allah because this testimony implicated
the defendant, while being advantageous to the two codefendants. Id.
1381. Id. at 399, 605 N.E.2d at 329, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 842. After the charge
to the jury, codefendant Robinson's attorney informed the court that due to a
medical emergency, he would leave his client in the temporary representation
of codefendant Thompson, with his client Robinson's consent. In addition,
Robinson's counsel stated that "he may consent to the readback, the delivery of
evidence to the jurors and do anything that I might have done if I were here."
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jointly represented by codefendant Robinson's attorney. 1382 The

trial court made no attempt to inquire whether this was acceptable
to the defendant nor did it warn defendant Allah of any potential
or actual conflict which might result from joint
representation. 1383 The appellate division unanimously affirmed
the conviction of defendant Allah, and held that the absence of
Allah's attorney and the subsequent joint representation by
codefendants counsel did not deprive defendant of his right to
1384
effective assistance of counsel.

On appeal, however, the New York Court of Appeals agreed
with defendant Allah and found that representation by
codefendants' counsel violated his right to counsel. 1385 The court

reasoned that defendant was not afforded his right to effective
assistance of counsel because there was a conflict of interest with
testimony of one of the codefendant's witnesses and that it
directly implicated Allah. 1386 This witness' testimony was clearly
1382. Id. In particular, defendant Allah's attorney stated that codefendants'
attorneys could "consent to read backs, presentation of evidence, et cetera, and
my client Iraefbey Allah has also consented[,]" to such joint representation.
Defendant Allah's consent to such was preserved on the record. Id.
1383. Id.
1384. People v. Allah, 576 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31, 177 A.D.2d 490, 491 (2d
Dep't 1991, rev'd, 80 N.Y.2d 396, 605 N.E.2d 357, 590 N.Y.S.2d 840
(1992). The appellate division based its holding on the fact that the record
revealed that defendant Allah, after being informed that his attorney would be
away for a few a days, expressly consented, in court, to be represented by the
codefendants' attorneys. Furthermore, the court noted that defendant's joint
representation by codefendants' attorney was effectively undertaken; nothing
indicated that the joint representation during deliberations created "a significant
possibility of a conflict of interest.., bearing a substantial relatiofiship to the
conduct of [his] defense." Id. (quoting People v. Recupero, 73 N.Y.2d 877,
879, 535 N.E.2d 287, 289, 538 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (1988)). However, the
court did note its disapproval of the lower court having permitted defendant's
counsel to leave during jury deliberations without having set forth an
explanation for his absence. Id.at 31, 177 A.D.2d at 491.
1385. Allah, 80 N.Y.2d at 400, 605 N.E.2d at 330, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
1386. Id.The principle issue on appeal was whether or not the defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his defense counsel's
absence led to his being jointly represented by codefendants' counsel, in
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adverse to defendant Allah's contention that he was not present at
the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the testimony tended to

exculpate the two codefendants, and thus a conflict existed since
counsel jointly represented all of the defendants.1387 Therefore,
defendant Allah's right to counsel was impaired by this joint
representation since an attorney has an "undivided responsibility"
1388
to his client and his client alone.
In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed the principle
established in People v. Macerola13 89 and People v.
Gomberg, 13 9 0 requiring the trial court, on the record, to inquire
whether each defendant has an "awareness of the potential risks
involved in that course and has knowingly chosen it'' 139 1 when
he consents to joint representation. Only after the trial court has
sufficiently cautioned all defendants of the inherent dangers
involved in such representation, may a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel be said to have been adequately
addition to whether or not the defendant knowingly chose to accept such
representation. Id.
1387. Id. In essence, the court was satisfied that an actual conflict of interest
existed in defendant Allah being jointly represented by counsel of his
codefendants where a key witness "implicated defendant while establishing a
defense for codefendants Thompson and Robinson." Id.
1388. Id.
1389. 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979). In
Macerola, the court held that the failure of the trial judge to ascertain, on the
record, whether each defendant was aware of the potential risks inherent in
joint representation of codefendants, constituted reversible error, where
conflict existed between each defendant's defense. Id.
1390. 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975). In
Gomberg, the court held that "trial court adequately and properly inquired of
defendants and their attorneys whether joint representation would result in
conflict of interest." Id. A defendant who then knowingly and intelligently
retains such representation cannot claim possible prejudice. Where the court
made such inquiries, defendants' right to effective assistance of counsel was
sufficiently protected. This was so even where one defendant initially
expressed some reluctance, but later acquiesced in the continuation of such
joint representation. Furthermore, the court gave the defendants added
protection against the possibility of conflicts of interest arising, and advised
that if at a later stage of the trial a conflict arose, the court would permit other
counsel to represent each individual defendant. Id.
1391. Allah, 80 N.Y.2d at 400, 605 N.E.2d at 330, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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and properly safeguarded. 1392 Such admonition by the trial court
must be on the record in order to preserve the issue for appeal
and therefore make it possible for the appellate courts to
determine whether a jointly represented defendant made an
informed decision. 1393
The court noted that in this case, since joint representation
arose at a crucial stage of trial - jury deliberation - the
defendant must be apprised of this conflict to ensure that his
consent to joint representation was based on informed
consent. 1394 Since there was nothing on the record to indicate
that the trial court took the necessary precautions to ensure that
defendant perceived the potential risks inherent in pursuing the
joint representation, the court concluded that defendant's consent
was not an informed one. 1395 Therefore, the joint representation
the defendant received deprived him of the right to the effective
1396
assistance of counsel.
In Macerola,1397 the court of appeals stated that "it is
indisputable that one accused of committing a crime is entitled to
the effective assistance of counsel." 1398 This right is guaranteed
not only by both the State 1399 and Federal Constitutions, 140 0 but
also by New York State statute. 140 1 Thus, the New York Court

1392. Id.
1393. Id.

1394. Id.
1395. Id.at 401, 605 N.E.2d at 330, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
1396. Id.
1397. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d at 257, 391 N.E.2d at 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d at
908.
1398. Id. at 262, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
1399. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1400. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1401. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWv § 210.15 (McKinney 1993). This statute
provides:
1. The defendant has a right to aid of counsel at the arraignment and
at every subsequent stage of the action, and, if he appears upon
such arraignment without counsel, has the following rights:
(a) To an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining counsel; and

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 47

1054

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

of Appeals has recognized that this right may be significantly
impaired when counsel engages in the joint representation of
defendants with conflicting interests. 1402 However, the joint

representation of a criminal defendant is not a per se violation of
a defendant's state 1403 or federal constitutional right 1404 and may
be allowed. The distinction in New York arises when
codefendants are represented by the same attorney. When this
occurs, the trial court must determine whether "the defendant's
decision to proceed with his attorney is an informed
decision." 1405 The rationale for imposing such inquiries is to
assure thorough and effective representation. To effectuate such
representation, a defense attorney must be able to cross-examine
witnesses, plan defense strategies, enter into plea negotiations,
maintain confidential relations, and the like. 1406 Therefore, prior

to the formal commencement of trial, the judge must ascertain,
on the record, whether each defendant is aware of the potential
(b)

3.

To communicate, free of charge, by letter or by telephone,
for the purposes of obtaining counsel and informing a relative
or friend that he has been charged with an offense; and
(c) To have counsel assigned by the court in any case where he
is financially unable to obtain the same.
The court must inform the defendant of all rights specified in
subdivision two. The court must accord the defendant opportunity
to exercise such rights and must itself take such affirmative action
as is necessary to effectuate them.

Id.
1402. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 312, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773
(citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)).
1403. See People v. Gonzalez, 30 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 280 N.E.2d 882, 885, 330
N.Y.S.2d 54, 59 (1972) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where no
conflict results from joint representation of codefendants).
1404. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The United States
Supreme Court held that joint representation is not a per se violation of the
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, however, a violation was
found where the trial judge failed to investigate the claim that a possible
conflict of interest existed regarding defendant's attorney. Id. at 484.
1405. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
774.
1406. Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standardfor Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1259 (1986).
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risk of joint representation, and whether the defendant has

nevertheless knowingly consented. 1407
A criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel
in New York differs significantly from that right under the
Federal Constitution. 140 8 Under the Federal Constitution, a trial
court does not have an affirmative duty to initiate an inquiry of
jointly represented defendants unless it has reason to know that a
14 10
the
conflict may actually exist. 140 9 In Cuyler v. Sullivan,
Supreme Court held that prejudice is presumed "when counsel is
burdened by an actual conflict of interest." 14 1 1 Furthermore,
prejudice will only be presumed if the defendant can demonstrate
that his defense counsel was actually representing conflicting
interests, and that it had an adverse affect on counsel's
performance. 14 12 The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment
does not require state courts to "initiate inquiries into the

propriety of multiple representation in every case." 14 13 Rather,
the Court noted that defense counsel's duty to avoid conflicting
representation, and to advise the court if such conflict arises,

adequately safeguards a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
1407. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 313-14, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
775. In addition, counsel must inform his clients of any conflicting interests
that may infringe upon such representation. Id.
1408. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
1409. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Cuyler, the Court
concluded that since the codefendants had separate trials, it significantly
reduced the potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, it noted that no
objection was made to the multiple representation, thus, the trial court had no
duty to inquire into the possibility of conflict of interest. Id. at 347.
1410. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
1411. Id. at 349-50. An attorney breaches a duty of loyalty owed the client
when burdened by actual conflict of interest. Id. at 346; see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court noted that certain exceptions
exist wherein prejudice is presumed where "[a]ctual or constructive denial of
assistance altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice." Id. at 692.
1412. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785
(1987) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when counsel's law partner
represented defendant's co-indictee where no showing was made that counsel
ever had to choose between conflicting interests).
1413. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346.
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right. 14 14 Therefore, there is no affirmative duty upon a trial
court to initiate an inquiry unless it knows that a conflict of
interest exists. 1415
Although New York's requirement of adequate inquiry differs
from that imposed by the federal courts, the constitutional right
to effective assistance is essentially identical. 14 16 Under both the
State and Federal Constitution, a defendant can knowingly and
1414. Id.; see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978)
(defense counsel is in best position to determine when a conflict of interest
exists or will develop during trial).
1415. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347.
1416. In addition, the federal courts similarly protect a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel. Federal Rule 44(c) of Criminal Procedure
states that
whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged.

. .

or

have been joined for trial ... and are represented by the same retained
or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are
associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with
respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each
defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including
separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to
believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such
measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to
counsel.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

1.7 (1993). Section 1.7 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will bear directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the implications of
the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
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intelligently waive the right to conflict-free

assistance of

1994

counsel.

14 17

While both the New York and Federal Constitution are in
harmony regarding the importance of safeguarding a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel, the duty imposed on trial
courts in New York more adequately safeguard a criminal
defendant's right to conflict-free representation. Conversely, the
standard maintained under federal law, that there be actual
conflict before a duty of inquiry is mandated, may not provide
defendants with the requisite knowledge of the inherent risks of
such representation.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
14 18
People v. Benson

(decided January 20, 1994)

Defendant claimed that the failure of his counsel to raise the
issue of his statutory right to a speedy trial, amounted to a denial
of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the
State1 4 19 and Federal1 4 2 0 Constitutions. 14 2 1 The court remitted

1417. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 553-54, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
774. (finding that defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive right to
separate representation).
1418.

__

A.D.2d

___,

606 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1994).

1419. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states, in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel. ... " Id.

1420. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. This provision states, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial... and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.; see
also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (stating that the right to
counsel includes the effective assistance of counsel).
1421. Benson,

__

A.D.2d at _,

606 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
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